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March 18, 2003
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
Post Office Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re:

State v. Angelos, Case No. 20010509-CA

Dear Ms. Stagg:
I am writing pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
advise the Court of authority relevant to the above-referenced case that recently
came to my attention. The following cases relate to defendant's claim that the trial
court was without jurisdiction when it resentenced him while the case was on appeal.
These cases support the State's argument that a sentence imposed on an unrepresented defendant is illegal and may be corrected by the trial court at any time under
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (Memorandum Decision)1 ("Utah law has
no comprehensive definition of sentences 'imposed in an illegal manner'; however,
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner
when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
sentencing");
Kuehnertv. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150,499 P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding
that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at
sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and
had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment rights);

1

This case is cited pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, \ 16,444 P.3d.
734, which allows the citation to memorandum decisions.
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State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991) ("Because an illegal
sentence is void, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence until that
sentence has been corrected").
A copy of these opinions is attached for the convenience of the Court.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
cc:

Scott Wiggins, attorney for defendant
William K. McGuire, Deputy David County attorney

Not Reported in P.2d
State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (Memorandum Opinion)
(Cite as: 2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas C. HEADLEY, Defendant and
Appellant.
No- 990462-CA.
Feb. 28, 2002.
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City,
for appellant.
Mark L Shurtlcff and Thomas Branker,
Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Before JACMQN, GREENWOOD, and
THORNE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
JACK SON, Presiding Judge.
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district
court's denial of his Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure. He contends the district court
erred in ruling that his motion did "not
attack the legality of the sentence imposed
nor the manner in which the sentence was
imposed." Headley's contention is
two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing
provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the
sentencing court relied on information in
the presentence report that the court knew
was false. We affirm.
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a
legal question that we review for
correctness, see.y.{WL^
856. 858-59 fUtah 1995); M . . . . . I ,
Patience. 944 P,2d 38K 384-85 (Utah
Ct.App.1997), and we can affirm the
decision "if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record."
State v. FinlavsonioOQ LT 10, ff 3 1 »)-!
P.2dl243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides for
resentencing when a sentence is illegal or
"imposed in an illegal manner." Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of an
"illegal sentence" has been construed
narrowly to include only sentences "where
the sentence does not conform to the crime
of which the defendant has been
convicted." ...[FN]J
S[m..xJ^{!:kL.^2
P.2d 104 L 1043 n. 2 fUtah Ct App. 1994V
Utah law has no comprehensive definition
of sentences "imposed in an illegal
manner"; however, the Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed
in an illegal manner when a defendant is
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deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment
right to counsel during sentencing. [FN2]
See AO^/w^^
499Pid839>8^
(concluding that
the sentence was illegal because the
defendant did not have counsel at
sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth
Amendment rights during sentencing, and
had not knowingly and intelligently
waived his Sixth Amendment rights).
[FN3] In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary

FNL Nonconforming sentences
include those where the sentence
exceeds the statutory limits. See,
e.g., State v. Higginhotham, 917
P.2d ^
gg ^ TuttaJb^ 19%)
(concluding that the sentence was
illegal because statute only
authorized one year enhancement
and the court enhanced sentence by
two years);
Stjate^£arleri^^9M.
P.2d 38L 388 fUtah^ CtAppi997^
(noting that the sentence was illegal
because it exceeded statutory term).
Nonconforming sentences also
occur when the court is without
jurisdiction to impose a sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Hurst. Ill P.2d
1029, 1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989)
(stating that sentences can be
attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing
court); State v. Arvisa 1999 UT
App 38L ff 5-8. 993 P.2d 894
(stating that the sentence was
illegal because Supremacy Clause

deprived sentencing court of
jurisdiction); Siate^J+'jJt^- 947
P. 2d 1 1 6 1 . 1168 fUt ah
Ct.App. 1997) (stating that the
sentence was illegal because court
did not have jurisdiction to revoke
probation).

FN2. Other jurisdictions have
defined sentences imposed in an
illegal manner as those that are
within statutory and jurisdictional
limits, but violate a defendant's
rights, see, e.g., Qoyemineyin^jhe
V.L v. Martinez. 239 R3d 293, 299
n. 3 (3rd Cir.2001): State v.
McNeills. 346 A.2d 292. 305-06
(Conn.Ct.App, 1988): State v.
Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 447, 479
(S.D.1996); cf.
SMt^JMe^m
661 P.2d 7 1 6 .
720-24
fHaw.Ct App. 1983); State v.
Brooks. 589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine
1991); or that are based on
erroneous information. See, e.g.,
United States v. Katziru 821 F 2d
234 238 (3rd Cir. 1987).

FN3. Kuehnert, which discusses
illegal sentences under the rules in
force prior to Rule 22(e), was not
cited in the parties' briefs.
so that there is a real opportunity to
present to the court facts in extenuation
of the offense or in explanation of the
defendant's conduct, as well as to correct
any errors or mistakes in reports of the
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defendant's past record and to appeal to
the equity of the court in its
administration and enforcement of penal
laws.
Id. at 840-41.XFN4J

FN4. See also McCj !Mdly...£A(l\l
393 U.S. 2. 4 89 S.Ct 3J 33- 34
(1968) ("As we said in Mcmpu /v.
Rhav. 389 L S. 128. 3 35. 88 S.Ct
254 257(1967) ], 'the necessity for
the aid of counsel in marshaling the
facts, introducing evidence of
mitigating circumstances[,] and in
general aiding and assisting the
defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent.1 The right to
counsel at sentencing must,
therefore, be treated like the right to
counsel at other stages of
adjudication." (Citation omitted.)).

Headley first claims his counsel at
sentencing provided ineffective assistance,
thus depriving him of his Sixth
Amendment right. To support his claim,
Headley makes six assertions, four are as
follows: (1) he asserts that his challenge to
misinformation in the presentence
investigation report was rejected by the
sentencing court because it was poorly
handled by sentencing counsel; (2) he
challenges several factual statements
contained in the presentence investigation
report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel
accused him of being involved in incest
when that information was not otherwise
before the court"; and (4) he asserts that

"his [sentencing] counsel convinced a
witness with potentially exculpatory
evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]."
Each of these four assertions has some
connection with the presentence
investigation report, which is not in the
record on appeal. Further, no other
information in the record supports these
assertions. Accordingly, as discussed
below, we are unable to address them.
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing
court imposed a $10,000 fine without
reason and without objection by his
counsel. We find no mention of a $10,000
fine in the record. The only fines
mentioned in the sentencing context, a
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified
amount to "pay for costs of extradition and
for therapy of victim," are found in the
sentencing transcript and the Judgment
filed three days later. Finally, Headley
alleges that "his counsel intentionally tried
to prevent him from pursuing an appeal."
However, the record reflects that Headley
filed a notice of appeal on September 24,
1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his
appeal to "file a motion to withdraw his
plea of guilty." Headley's motion was
granted on October 8,1992, and the record
contains no indication of subsequent
attempts to appeal the case.
Without the presentence report or other
information which may or may not be in
the sentencing court record, the record
submitted to us is inadequate for our
review of Headley's ineffective assistance
claim. All we have are Headley's
unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct.
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As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an
appellate court], he has the duty and
responsibility of supporting such
allegation by an adequate record. Absent
that record, a defendant's assignment of
error stands as a unilateral allegation
which the reviewing court has no power
to determine. [An appellate court] simply
cannot rule on a question which depends
for its existence upon alleged facts
u n s u p p o r t e d by the record.
Consequently, in the face of an
[inadequate record on appeal, [we] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings
below.
Shite v. Penman. %4 P.2d 1157, 1162
(1998) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (alterations in original); see also
State v. Litherland 2000 VT 7b. «f 17, 12
P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply
will be construed in favor of a finding that
counsel performed
effectively.").
Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth
Amendment claim.
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court
was biased because it relied on
information in the presentence report that
the court knew was false. Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(6) fSupp.200n gives a
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating
information in a presentence report and
requires the judge to "make a
determination of relevance and accuracy
on the record." Here, the sentencing judge
made a determination of the relevance and
accuracy of the presentence report,

deciding the presentence report was
"comprehensive in all the details," and
stating that those working on elements of
the presentence report "do a pretty good
job." The sentencing court has broad
discretion to resolve factual disputes for or
against a defendant, see id., and we cannot
say the court exceeded its discretion in
making this determination. Further,
without the presentence report, the record
is inadequate and " '[we] must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below.' "
Penman. 964 P.2d al 1162 (citation
omitted) (alteration in original).
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e)
motion for resentencing.

WILLIAM A/niORNE JR.. J., concur.

CIKEEXWOQD, Judge (concurring in the
result).
I concur in the result reached by my
colleagues, but would affirm on what I
perceive to be a more straightforward
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial
court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion
because the motion did "not attack the
legality of the sentence imposed nor the
manner in which the sentence was
imposed." The trial court was correct.
Defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and erroneous fact
findings by the sentencing judge are
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simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e).
Defendant has not cited any caselaw
holding otherwise and has also not offered
any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e)
should apply to his case. See Sjgfo_\K
Thomas. %1 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)
(briefs must include "reasoned analysis
based on [cited] authority"). The sentence
imposed was permissible under applicable
statutes, and the trial court properly
resolved factual disputes presented to it.
Defendant raises no claims legitimately
related to whether the sentence was illegal
or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would
affirm.
2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.), 2002 UT
App58
END OF DOCUMENT
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State v. Kuehnert, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972)
(Cite as: 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P.2d 839)
€

West Headnotes
Supreme Court of Utah.

Max KUEHNERT, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State
Prison, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 12656.
July 18, 1972.

Prisoner petitioner for writ of habeas
corpus. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered
order denying petition and the petitioner
appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister,
C.J., held that where defendant was
represented by counsel at time his plea of
guilty was entered and there was no entry
as to withdrawal of counsel prior to
sentencing at which defendant appeared
without counsel and without receiving
advice as to his right to counsel, absence
of counsel rendered sentence invalid and
cause would be remanded with directions
to proceed to fix date for pronuncing
sentence in proper manner.

[1] Sentencing and Punishment ^ ^ 3 4 9
350Hk349 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k988)
Since habeas corpus petitioner was not
informed of his right to the presence of
counsel at time of sentencing, there was no
ground upon which to predicate a waiver
of this right by him. Const, art, i. §£ 12,
13.
[2] Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 3 4 8
350Hk348 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k988)
It is necessary to have counsel present at
time of hearing so that there is a real
opportunity to present to court facts in
extenuation of offense or in explanation of
defendant's conduct, to correct any errors
or mistakes in reports of defendant's past
record and to appeal to equity of court in
its administration and enforcement of
penal laws. Const M...J.^.i.LJ2> l i ;
U.C.A. 1953, 77-35-17.
[3] Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 3 4 8
350Hk348 M M T i M C i ^ e s
(Formerly 110k980(l))

Remanded with directions.
Ellett, J., concurred in the result and filed
an opinion.

[31 Criminal Law ^1181.5(8)
110k! 181.5(8) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kll81)
Where defendant was represented by
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counsel at time his plea of guilty was
entered and there was no entry as to
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing
at which defendant appeared without
counsel and without receiving advice as to
his right to counsel, absence of counsel
rendered sentence invalid and cause would
be remanded with directions to proceed to
fix date for pronouncing sentence in
proper manner. Const, art. K SS 12, JL3;
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17.
**839 *150 Margret S. Taylor, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David S.
Young, David R. Irvine, Asst. Attys. Gen.,
*151 Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.

CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the
district court denying his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
The trial court determined that plaintiff
was lawfully incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison pursuant to a conviction of the
crime of forgery based upon a guilty plea,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered, and that plaintiffs rights were not
violated by lack of counsel at the
sentencing proceeding.
On appeal plaintiff asserts that his
sentence was invalid and void on the
ground that he was without counsel at a

critical stage of the criminal proceedings,
namely, at the time of sentencing.
A review of the record reveals that
plaintiff was represented by counsel at the
time his plea of guilty was entered;
furthermore, there was no entry of
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing.
At the time of sentencing the trial court
neither advised plaintiff of his right to
counsel nor made inquiry as to why
counsel was not present. In the colloquy
between the court and plaintiff, the court
merely queried **840 whether it was
plaintiffs desire not to wait but to be
sentenced immediately, to which plaintiff
responded affirmatively and expressed
appreciation for prompt attention, as his
stay in the jail was 'dead time.'
11] During the evidentiary hearing on
plaintiffs petition, the court queried
whether the State desired to show a waiver
by plaintiff of counsel at the sentencing
The State responded negatively. The State
was of the opinion that lack of counsel at
the sentencing constituted harmless error.
The issue of waiver was, therefore, not
presented to the trial court. However, it
should be observed that since plaintiff was
not informed of his right to the presence of
counsel, there is no ground upon which ot
predicate a waiver of this right. [FN 1 j

FNL See hi re Hanx 71 Cal.2d
102L 80 Cal.Rptr. 588. 594 458
P.2d 500.506 (1969V wherein the
court stated: '. . . we cannot
condone in the present case the
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failure of the trial court to re inform
defendant of his right to counsel
when he appeared for the first time
without his counsel for sentencing,
nor can we countenance the trial
court's failure to require defendant's
waiver of his right to counsel in
open court before the rendition of
sentence.'

Asid£...J.x...Scciion Ll,..X^>ns^
Utah, provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel,....
In the case of In re Boyce,[PX2] the court
held that under *152Mide.j,..Sectipn..il
of the Constitution of California, which is
substantially similar to Article 1, Section
12. of the Constitution of Utah, a
defendant was entitled to counsel when
judgment was pronounced and sentence
imposed. The court held the judgment
must be set aside and the matter remanded
for resentencing with counsel present,
where it appeared that defendant had been
represented by counsel at all prior stages
of the proceedings but was without
counsel at the time the judgment and
sentence were pronounced. This ruling
was considered particularly applicable
where there was nothing in the record to
indicate that defendant was informed of
his right to counsel or that he knew that he
was entitled to the aid of an attorney. [FN 3]

FN2. 51 Cal.2d 699, 33b P.2d 164,

165 (1939).

FN3. Also see People v. Hortoru
174 Cal.App.2d 740. 345 P.2d 45.
47 (1959V

In Lee v. State, [F\4j the court stated that
while there was a sharp conflict in
authorities as to whether the presence of
counsel for an accsed was necessary at the
time of sentence, they thought the better
rule was that when counsel had not been
waived, the absence thereof invalidated the
sentence. The court observed that if there
were any time that a defendant on a
criminal charge might be in need of an
attorney to speak in his behalf or to advise
him of his legal rights it could well be at
the time of sentencing.

FN4. 99 Ariz,.269,Ji)8.P Id 408,
409 (1965V

In this jurisdiction, Section 77-35—17,
U.C.A.1953, grants the trial judge power
to place the defendant on probation.
. . . The granting or withholding of
probation involves considering
intangibles of character, personality and
attitude, of which the cold record gives
little inkling. These matters, which are
to be considered in connection with the
prior record of the accused, are of such
nature that the problem of probation
must of necessity rest within the
discretion of the judge who hears the
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case. . . .JFN5]

FN5. State v Sihert. ft Utah 2d
198. 205. 310 P.2d 388. 393
(1957).

[2] The foregoing indicates the necessity
of the presence of counsel at the time of
sentencing; so that there is a real
opportunity to present to the court facts in
extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as
well as to correct any errors or mistakes in
reports of the defendant's past record and
to appeal to the equity of the court in its
administration **841 and enforcement of
penal laws.[n<6]

FN6. See Maitiiiv. UnitM.Sl3.tSS
( C A 5th 19501182F.2d 225. 22
A.L.R.2d 1236, 1239-1240.

The conflict in the authorities to which the
court made reference in Lee v. State [FN 7]
has been resolved by the United States
Supreme *153 Court. In McConnell v.
Rhay,[FN8j the court stated:

FN7. Note 4, supra.

FN8. 3^3 US. X 4, 89 S O . 32. 2 i
L.Ed.2d2.4fl968V
As we said in Mempa (v

U.S. 128. 88 S.Ct 254.19 L.Ed.2d 336V
'the necessity for the aid of counsel in
marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and
in general aiding and assisting the
defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent.' 38*) T S al 135. 88
S.Ct at 257. 19 L.Ed.2d at341. The
right to counsel at sentencing must,
therefore, be treated like the right to
counsel at other stages of adjudication.
121 & the instant action, since the record
does not indicate that plaintiff knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to
counsel at the time of sentencing, we are
compelled to hold his sentence invalid.
However, this does not mean that the
plaintiff is entitled to an absolute
discharge.
The defect in the first sentence did not
inhere in the judgment of conviction.
The defendant pleaded guilty, and made
no attack on any of the proceedings
except the sentence. Had he appealed
from the illegal sentence, as he had a
right to do, notwithstanding his plea of
guilty, this court would have set aside
the sentence as void and have remanded
the case to the trial court for a valid
sentence.
(Citation) There is no
principle on which it can be successfully
maintained that, by serving part of a void
sentence instead of appealing from it, but
later attacking it in collateral
proceedings, the defendant can obtain
immunity from being sentenced to the
judgment p r o v i d e d by
law.
(Citation)|TV>j

Rhay, 389
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FN9. State v Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68,
72,7 P.2d 825.826 (1932): also see
Ex Parte Folck, Folck v„JYa]ion:u
102 Utah 470. 473. 132 PJd 130
(1942V

This cause is remanded to the district
court with directions to proceed to fix a
date for pronouncing sentence upon
plaintiff in a manner consistent with the
views herein expressed.

TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT,
JJ., concur.

ELLETT, Justice (concurring in the
result):
I concur in the result, not because there
was any error below, but simply to avoid
having the matter taken before the federal
courts, where the defendant would be
released. There is no federal question
involved in this matter. [FNlj

FN1. See my lonesome opinion in
Dvett v. Turner. 20 Utah 2d 403.
439 P.2d 266 (19681

Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
At the time of the adoption of this
Amendment there was no right to counsel
in the courts of England in felony cases.
In fact, it was not until 1826, 50 years after
the Amendment, that a defendant charged
with felony in the courts of England could
be represented by counsel at trial.
It was a determination by the people of
the 13 colonies to see that the new federal
entity did not follow the rule of the
English courts which prompted the
language above quoted to be included in
the Amendment.
**842 The Amendment does not say, and
it never was meant to say that a criminal
must have counsel. All it ever said was
that he had a right to have counsel to assist
him.
In this case the defendant was never
denied any right to have counsel and so I
would affirm the trial court in what was
done. However, I can see no harm in
permitting a new sentence to be imposed
upon the defendant.
499 P.2d 839, 28 Utah 2d 150

Even if the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment were applicable to this case,
it * 154 should not require a release of the
defendant on a habeas corpus proceeding.
So far as pertinent to this matter, that

END OF DOCUMENT
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State v Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991)
(Cite as: 825 P.2d 676)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David MONTOYA, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 900319-CA.

date of entry of judgment or order
appealed from. Rules App Pioc , Ruk

4(a).
IH Criminal Law ^ 1 0 6 9 ( 1 )
110kl069(n Most Cited t\jse<;
Time for filing appeal is jurisdictional and
ordinarily cannot be enlarged.
Rules
App.Proc Rule 4(e).

Dec. 31, 1991.

Defendant convicted of attempted rape
was resentenced more than a year later by
the Second District Court, Weber County,
Stanton M. Taylor, J., in order to permit
appeal, and defendant appealed.
The
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1)
resentencing for sole purpose ofpermitting
appeal is improper; (2) review of appeal
of resentencing must be limited to
propriety of resentencing; (3) original
sentence was legal; and (4) court lacked
jurisdiction to resentence defendant.
Appeal dismissed.

PI Sentencing and Punishment ^^2315
350Hk2315 Most Cited Ca^s
(Formerly 110k996(3))
Resentencing order by stipulation
imposing same sentence as before, except
giving credit for time served, for sole
purpose ofpermitting appeal even though
statutory period had passed, was
inappropriate manipulation of judicial
system. Rule^> Civ Pioc , Rule foBfi).
141 Criminal Law ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 3 )
110kll34m Most Cited Cases
[41 Criminal Law ^1134(10)
HOkl 134(10^ MONI Cued C ases

West Headnotes
[11 Criminal Law ^1081(4.1)
llOklOSl^.n Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110kl081(4))
In appeal permitted as matter of right,
notice must be filed within 30 days after

Court of Appeals limited its review to
sentence imposed, without considering
validity of conviction, where defendant
appealed resentencing, rather than
following appropriate procedures to obtain
postconviction relief. U.C.A.1953,
77-35-22(e) (Repealed); Rules t <rv Proc ,
Rule 6 5 6 ^ .
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[5] Sentencing and Punishment ^^2229
350Hk2229 Mest.CheiCases
(Formerly 110k996(l. 1))

District court's jurisdiction over
resentencing turns on whether initial
sentence was legal.

[51 Criminal Law € ^1134(10)
110k! 134(10) MQSLQteiCases

191 Sentencing and Punishment € ^2279
350Hk2279 M^iliMLCascs
(Formerly 110k996(2))

If original sentence imposed was valid,
trial court would have had no further
subject matter jurisdiction to resentence
defendant, and Court of Appeals would
have no jurisdiction to hear appeal of
resentencing.
161 Criminal Law ^ 1 0 3 3 . 1
110kl033.1 Mounted. Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok 103 3(1))
Court of Appeals can raise issue that goes
to jurisdiction sua sponte and at any time.
[7] Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 2 2 8
350Hk228 Most.Cjte(l.Cases
(Formerly 1 r6k979(2))
[7] Sentencing and Punishment €^2271
350Hk2271 Most .Cjted.Cases
(Formerly 110k979(2))
Because illegal sentence is void, court
does not lose jurisdiction over sentence
until that sentence has been corrected;
likewise, once court imposes valid
sentence, it loses subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.
[£1 Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 2 2 2 9
350Hk2229 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k996(l.l))

Court can correct illegal sentence at any
time.
U.C.A.1953, 77-35- 22(e)
(Repealed).
[10] Criminal Law ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 1 0 )
110k! 134(10) Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals reviews appropriateness
of resentencing of defendant convicted of
attempted rape, but for whom no alienist
was appointed, by determining whether
court clearly erred in failing to comply
with code section governing appointment
of alienists at time of original sentence.
U.C.A. 1953. 77-16-L 77-16-2.
l U l Criminal Law ^^1158(1)
110kll58m M ^ i l i M i l a s e s
In reviewing judge's decision not to
appoint alienist to evaluate defendant
allegedly suffering from mental disease or
defect, Court of Appeals uses clearly
erroneous standard to review findings on
the factors outlined in the statute, and
reviews ultimate conclusion based on
those findings for correctness.
U.C.A.1953. 77-16-L 77-16-2;
M^
Civ.Proc. Rule 52(aV
[12] Criminal Law ^ 1 1 4 4 . 1
110k! 144.1 Most Cited Cases
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(Formerly 1 lOkl 144)

have substantially contributed
commission of the offense.

Court of Appeals assumed that trial court
found that defendant, who was allegedly
suffering from mental disease, was not in
fact suffering from mental disease or
defect which may have substantially
contributed to commission of offense,
where trial court made no explicit findings
in support of its decision not to appoint
alienist. U.CA.1C>53, 77-16-1, 77-16-2.
[13] Mental Health ^ 4 3 4
257Ak434 Most Cited Cases
Statute governing appointment of alienist
to evaluate defendant alleged to suffer
from mental disease or defect requires that,
where circumstances suggest possibility
that defendant has mental disease or
defect, and where circumstances suggest
that mental disease or defect may have
substantially contributed to commission of
crime, court shall order mental
examination of that person. U.C. A .1.^53^
77-16-1.

to

[15] Sentencing and Punishment
^2229
350Hk2229 Mosl.Cited..Cases
(Formerly 110k996(l.l))
€

District court lacked jurisdiction to
resentence defendant charged with
attempted rape, where initial sentence was
legal.
*677 Jose Luis Trujillo, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H.
Atherton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellee.

Before BENCH. GARFF, and JACKSON,
JJ.

OPINION
GARFF, Judge:

[14] Criminal Law ^ 9 8 1 ( 1 )
110k98im Most Cited Cases
Court did not err in refusing to make
finding that defendant may have been
suffering from mental disease or defect
that may have substantially contributed to
commission of the crime, where evidence
of mental illness referred to defendant's
state of mind during trial and shortly after,
and did not bear on defendant's state of
mind during commission of crime nor
suggest that mental disease or defect may

On November 23, 1988, David Montoya
was convicted of attempted rape, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-4-102 and 76- i:401U.i?()).
He now appeals his conviction.
We
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 15, 1988, a document
entitled "Judgment, Sentence, and
Commitment to Utah State Prison" was
entered wherein Montoya was sentenced to
a term *678 of one to fifteen years.
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Montoya did not file an appeal within the
statutory period after he was sentenced.
However, apparently, in order to afford
Montoya an enlargement of time to appeal
his sentence, the State stipulated with
Montoya to a resentencing. [FKJJ
Pursuant to the stipulation, he was
resentenced on May 14, 1990 so that he
could timely appeal [FN2]

FN1. The only document in the
record suggesting the basis for
resentencing is a letter written by
the court to defense counsel:
In response to your inquiry of April
19, 1989 I did not order an
evaluation at the State Hospital. I
did recommend to the prison
authorities that they evaluate him
for possible hospitalization.
If Mr. Montoya wishes to file an
appeal, the State seldom objects to
a resentencing for that purpose and
it seems probable we could
accommodate such a request.
I have also enclosed a copy of his
letter to me and hope you may
address with him some of his
concerns.

FN2. In Suite v. Johnson ft35 P.2d
36 (Utah 1981) the court, by way of
dicta, suggests that a defendant
who requests his or her attorney to
file an appeal within the statutory
thirty-day limit, and whose attorney
fails to do so, may file a motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to

Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(i). If the court
thereupon finds defendant's
position meritorious, then
resentencing would be appropriate
in order to afford him an
opportunity to appeal. MJJJL?JL

Montoya filed his notice of appeal on
June 12, 1990, wherein he stated he was
appealing "the decision made May 14,
1990 and the underlying conviction of
attempted conviction of rape."
He
challenges his conviction and sentencing
claiming (1) the court erred by failing to
appoint an alienist
[FN?] prior to
sentencing, pursuant to Utah Code Ann £
77-16-2 (1980): (2) his counsel was
inadequate because (a) he failed to petition
for a competency hearing prior to trial, and
(b) he failed to move that an alienist
examine Montoya; and (3) the court erred
by failing to disqualify a juror. We note
that issue (1) pertains to Montoya's
sentence, and issues (2) and (3) pertain to
his conviction.
FN3.M A seldom used term meaning
one who has specialized in the
study of mental diseases. Persons
qualified by experience,
knowledge, and previous
opportunities to express opinion as
to defendant's mental condition at a
particular time."
Black's Law
Dictionary 67 (5th ed. 1979).

TIMELY APPEAL
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We first consider whether the appeals
from the conviction and the sentence were
timely filed.
11112 J In an appeal permitted as a matter
of right, the notice must be filed within
thirty days "after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from." Utah
RApp.P. 4(a). Here, the notice of appeal
was filed well over a year after Montoya's
conviction and sentence. The time for
filing an appeal is jurisdictional and
ordinarily cannot be enlarged. Suite v.
Johnson 635 P.2d 36. 37 (Utah N81);
State v. Boggess. 60 i P.2d 927, 928- 29
(Utah 1979V [1N4]

FN4. For example, Rule 4(e) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
allows a trial court the discretion to
extend the time for filing by thirty
days.

In Johnson, the court stated by way of
dicta that postconviction proceedings
"could be used, in carefully limited
circumstances, to modify or vacate a
judgment where extra-record facts showed
that the defendant had been deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial, including
the right to the assistance of counsel." /{/..
at 38. The supreme court relied on Peo.llh
v. Callaway. 24X.Y.2d 127,299\\¥,S.2d
154, 247 N.E.2d 128 (1969) which
suggests that the purpose of the
postconviction hearing is to determine
whether the defendant

was induced, by reason of that
representation, to allow his time to take
an appeal to expire or that he was misled
as to his right to appeal, he should—in
accordance with the procedure we have
adopted-be resentenced nunc pro tunc
upon the previous finding of guilt so as
to afford him "an opportunity of
prosecuting and perfecting an appeal,
since the time for taking such appeal
would date from the rendition of the new
judgment."
Id 2Q9 N.Y.S.2d al 15b. 247 XMld ai
130 (quoting People v ihursnm, 10
N.Y.2d 92. 94 217 N.Y.S.2d 77. 78, 176
N.E.2d 90. 91(196 ttl
[3] *679 Here, nothing indicates the
resentencing was conducted pursuant to
UtahR.Civ.P.65B(rt or that findings were
made pursuant to Johm on. In fact, it
appears that a hearing was not even held.
Only an order was entered imposing the
same sentence as before, except giving
credit for time served. It appears the only
purpose of the order was to open the door
to an appeal even though the statutory
period had long since passed. We find no
merit to this procedure and deem such
manipulation of the judicial system highly
inappropriate. If the defendant has a
legitimate claim that his constitutional
right to a fair trial was violated because he
was denied effective assistance of counsel,
he should follow the procedures under
Rule 65B(i) as outlined in Johnson.
[4] Giving defendant the benefit of the
doubt, we are presented here with an
appeal of a resentencing, presumably
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pursuant to Utah R Crim.P 22(e), which
allows for correction of an illegal sentence.
We therefore limit our review to the
sentence and decline to even consider the
conviction because it is not appropriately
before us.
JURISDICTION
[5j[6j To determine whether Montoya's
appeal of his resentencing is properly
before this court, we must determine
whether the initial sentence was valid. If
it was valid, the trial court would have had
no further subject matter jurisdiction to
resentence Montoya. Likewise, this court
would have no jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
Because the issue goes to
jurisdiction, this court can raise the issue
sua sponte and at any time. Crump \
Crump. 8?) I12d 1172, 1175-74 (Utah
App.1991).
Ul[%l The Utah Supreme Court has
recognized the 'continuing jurisdiction of
a trial court to correct an illegal sentence."
State v. Babbel 8 P P 2d Sh 88 {Utah
1991V Because an illegal sentence is
void, the court does not lose jurisdiction
over the sentence until that sentence has
been corrected
W
The negative
implication of this principle is also spelled
out in Buhhel Once a court imposes a
valid sentence, it loses subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, hi (citing State
v. Lee Lim. 79 Utah 68, 74. 7 P 2d 825.
827 (1932)). Thus, the district court's
jurisdiction over the resentencing turns
onwhether the initial sentence was legal.

j9]|I0j A court can correct an illegal
sentence at any time. Utah R.Crim P
22(e) (1991); Bahhj /J* 1 ^ P 16 at 871 / t v
Lim. 79 Utah at 7 1 7 P 2d at 82'»-27 We
review the appropriateness of a
resentencing by determining whether the
court clearly erred m failing to comply
with I ftah Code \\m ^ 77-16-1 and -2 at
the time of the original sentence. Babnel,
813P.2dat86: Sunt v Bahhjll 770 P 2d
987. 993 (Utah 1989V
Uah Code ^nn 6 77-jp-l (1900)
requires the following:
Whenever any person is convicted of or
pleads guilty to rape ... or an attempt to
commit [rape], and when it appears to
the court either upon its own observation
or upon evidence otherwise presented,
that the defendant may be suffering from
any form of mental disease or defect
which may have substantially
contributed to the commission of the
offense, the court shall order a mental
examination of that person.
As to the mental examination itself, Utah
Code Aim § 77-16-2 (1990;> requires that
it be conducted "by two or more alienists
appointed by the judge."
[1 Ij In reviewing the judge's decision not
to appoint an alienist, we use a clearly
erroneous standard to review the findings
on the factors outlined in the statute. Stat*
v. DePlontv. 749 P 2d 62U fr27 (Uah
1987); ri'NS] Utah R C\\ 1' Via). We
review the ultimate conclusion based on
those findings for correctness. DsPUmn.
749 P.2d at 627; West Vail?) City \
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Majestic Irrv. Co.. 818 P 2d 131L 1313
(Utah App. 1991V

FN5. The language of Iltd!htUX. is
potentially confusing: "On appeal,
we do not disturb the conclusions
of the trier of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. L ^ J L Q v J L
32(a) (1987)." 749 P.2d at 62?
(emphasis added). This passage
refers to findings of fact despite
usage of the word "conclusions."
This interpretation is borne out by
the reference to the "trier of fact"
and by the cite to Ulah R.Civ.P.
52(a) which specifically applies to
findings of fact.

|12j *680 Here, the court made no explicit
findings as to the statutory factors. In
such cases, "we 'assume that the trier of
facts found them in accord with its
decision, and we affirm the decision if
from the evidence it would be reasonable
to find facts to support it.' " Stale v.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774. 787 (Utah 1Q9Q
(quoting Ajosver v. McCarthy, 122J Jtah 1,
6.245 P.2d 224. 226 (1952V). Therefore,
because the court did not appoint an
alienist, we assume the court found that
Montoya was not suffering from a mental
disease or defect which may have
substantially contributed to the
commission of the offense.
Accordingly, the first issues in
determining whether the court clearly
erred in its findings supporting its refusal

to appoint an alienist in the initial
sentencing are (1) whether, from the
evidence or from the court's observation,
Montoya may have been suffering from a
mental disease or defect; and (2) whether
the mental disease or defect may have
substantially contributed to the
commission of the crime.
[13] In analyzing the statute, we note the
combination of mandatory and permissive
language. That is, the statute requires
that, where circumstances suggest a
possibility that a defendant has a mental
disease or defect, and where circumstances
suggest that the mental disease or defect
may have substantially contributed to the
commission of the crime, "the court shall
order a mental examination of that
person." Utah Code Ann. $ 77-16-1
(1990) (emphasis added).
Accord
DePlonty. 749 P.2d at (>25.
DAI As to the trial itself, Montoya
testified on his own behalf.
He was
subjected to direct, cross, and redirect
examination. The transcript reveals he
was coherent. He said nothing about a
mental disease or defect, nor did his
counsel elicit any information or behavior
suggesting one.
While his testimony
differed from that of the victim, his
answers pertained to the questions posed.
His appropriate reference to her testimony
during his own evidences his ability to
track the victim's testimony. In short,
neither the evidence produced at trial nor
Montoya's demeanor during the trial
should have caused the court to find that
Montoya may have suffered from a mental
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disease or defect.
After the verdict was read, the following
conversation ensued:
MR. POORMAN: Your Honor, it's my
client's desire to request a pre-sentence
report in this matter.
Mrs. Garner's
indicated to me a date of December 12th,
that she could have that report prepared
by then.
We would also request of the Court a
court order with regards to a
psychological examination of Mr.
Montoya while he stays at—pending that
pre- sentence report by Mrs. Garner.
THE COURT: Any objection to that,
Mr. Heward?
MR. HEWARD: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So ordered.
Do you need a special order on that,
Debbie, or do you make arrangements?
MS. GARNER: Are you going to use
alienists or are you going to use—
THE COURT: I think probably that
might be preferable.
MS. GARNER: Can they get it done?
I mean, can they see him? What—I
think, if I may express myself, he needs
or wants treatment or at least to be seen
by somebody right now. He's really
concerned about his-about his wellbeing.
THE COURT: Well, rather than doing it
on a formal basis and to appoint an
alienist, why don't we just refer the
matter to Weber County Mental Health
and let's have someone from Mental
Health come over and visit with him.
MR. POORMAN: That will be fine,
Your Honor.
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim

THE COURT: Why don't we do this.
Let's contact Steve Watson and just
explain that they're not-they're not only
concerned about the sentence, but the
defendant apparently is having some
problems. So we'll have Mr. Watson or
someone from his office come over and
speak to him.
In response to the court's request, Steven
Watson, a clinical social worker from
Weber County Mental Health, visited with
Montoya and filled out an assessment form
as follows:
*681 At request of Judge Taylor subject
seen. Mental status: Orient X 3 clear
stream of thought.
Makes some
suggestion of hallucination but
genuineness is questionable.
Wants
sleeping or nerve pills. If continues in
jail here, evaluate further in a week.
As to this postverdict colloquy, the only
evidence of a mental disease or defect
relates to the comments of Montoya's
counsel, those of the AP & P officer, and
the one-paragraph report from the Weber
County Mental Health social worker.
Specifically, the AP & P officer mentioned
that Montoya was concerned "about his
well-being" at the present time, and that he
wanted treatment.
The social worker
questioned the genuineness of Montoya's
suggestion that he was hallucinating.
The evidence just described goes only to
Montoya's current state of mind during the
trial and shortly after. It does not go to
Montoya's state of mind during the
commission of the crime, nor does it
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

suggest that any such mental disease or
defect "may have substantially contributed
to the commission of the offense." Thus,
the court did not clearly err in refusing to
make such a finding. Accordingly, the
statute was never triggered and the initial
sentence was therefore valid. [FNbj

END OF DOCUMENT

FN6. Montoya would have us
consider a presentence report
completed December 2, 1988.
This report is not part of the
appellate record, and its
authenticity cannot be verified.
Therefore this court cannot
consider it.
Even so, we see
nothing in the report which would
support a finding that any mental
disease or defect may have
substantially contributed to the
commission of the offense.

U51 Because any jurisdiction to
resentence Montoya would have to have
been based on an illegality or voidness in
the initial sentence, and because the initial
sentence was legal, the district court lost
subject matter jurisdiction over Montoya's
sentence. Consequently, this court has no
jurisdiction and we are therefore required
to dismiss the appeal.
Dismissed.

BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
825 P.2d 676
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